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ABSTRACT 
Chinese anti-dumping measures against Republic of Korea 
By 
 BUTH DADIYA 
Many countries around the world began using anti-dumping measures once again 
after 2011 and in recent years, it was well-known that People’s Republic of China 
(Henceforth China) was notorious for this kind of measures and at the same time, this country 
also emerges as Republic of Korea’s (Henceforth Korea) important trading partner. Due to 
the significance of trade between these two large economies, it is crucial to study the 
relationship between anti-dumping measures and trade flow between these two countries. 
Consequently, this study uses Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) to investigate 
the impact of Chinese anti-dumping measures on import quantity and import value from 
Korea. The empirical finding in this paper indicates that Chinese anti-dumping measures 
have adverse effect on trade flow from Korea. Statistically, Chinese import quantity and 
import value from Korea decline by 18% and 13% respectively while Chinese anti-dumping 
measures are in place. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General information about anti-dumping 
According to World Trade Organization (2017), “dumping is, in general, a situation 
of international price discrimination, where the price of a product when sold in the importing 
country is less than the price of that product in the market of the exporting country.” 
However, the price in exporting country (normal value) is unknown in some cases so export 
price to a third country or constructed value including production cost in exporting country, 
administrative cost, selling and general costs and reasonable amount of profit are used instead 
of normal value for comparison with export price. Importing industries which suffer from this 
unfair trade practice can request their government to impose anti-dumping measures on 
dumped products. It is very crucial to note that these measures are intended to remedy trade 
injury in importing countries, not to protect domestic industries from their foreign 
competitors. Thus, government imposing anti-dumping measures must remove their measures 
when dumping has stopped. Also, WTO members are allowed to impose anti-dumping 
measures on dumped products if those members can prove three things: 1) dumping is 
occurring, 2) there is material injury in importing market, and 3) there is evident proving that 
material injury in importing market correlates with the occurrence of dumping (WTO, 2017).  
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1.2. Research problem and importance of the study 
According to Bown and Crowley (2016), anti-dumping was considered as the most 
significant instrument of contingent protection compared with other instruments such as 
countervailing duties and safeguards based on frequency of use and import coverage. In 
addition, some other research findings also indicated that anti-dumping measures could 
disrupt trade flow between countries. Besedes and Prusa (2013) proved that anti-dumping 
measures could eliminate trade and it could increase hazard rate by more than 50%. Prusa 
(1996) utilized time series trade data to study the trade effect of anti-dumping cases. In his 
study, the finding indicated that there was 47% decrease in US imports from her trading 
partners which were subject to anti-dumping investigation during the first year for countries 
suffering from high anti-dumping duty.  Also, Bellora and Jean (2016) proved that Chinese 
exports to European Union increased from 3.9% to 5.3% because there was decrease in anti-
dumping duties and number of sanctions against China. On the other hand, it is undeniable 
that trade is very beneficial for both developed and developing countries. According to Asian 
Development Bank (2017), international trade can help both developed and developing 
countries accomplish some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite the 
benefits that trade can provide, Davis (2009) and Nakgyoon (2016) claimed that some 
countries still utilized anti-dumping measures for either remedying trade injury or protecting 
their domestic industries and obviously, anti-dumping measures are detrimental to 
international trade. Realizing adverse impact of anti-dumping measures on trade, this paper is 
intended to specifically study relationship between anti-dumping measures and trade flow 
from Korea to China.  
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1.3. Objectives of the study and hypotheses to be tested 
1.3.1. Specific objectives 
a) To examine the impact of Chinese anti-dumping measures on import quantity 
from Korea 
b) To examine the impact of Chinese anti-dumping measures on import value from 
Korea 
1.3.2. Hypotheses to be tested 
a) H0 = Chinese anti-dumping measures do not reduce import quantity from Korea. 
H1 = Chinese anti-dumping measures reduce import quantity from Korea. 
b) H0 = Chinese anti-dumping measures do not decrease import value from Korea. 
H1 = Chinese anti-dumping measures decrease import value from Korea. 
1.4. Structure of the paper 
This paper is arranged into five chapters. The first chapter introduces general 
information regarding anti-dumping, research problem, importance of this research and study 
objectives. Chapter 2 reviews various literatures relating to anti-dumping measures. Research 
methodology and key findings will be discussed in chapter 3 and 4 respectively and chapter 5 
concludes this paper.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Trade relation between China and Korea 
After China reformed and modernized her economy in the late 1970s and established 
strong diplomatic relation with Korea, the two countries began to trade more with each other 
and they also diversified their exporting products. According to UN Comtrade, there was a 
sharp rise in exporting commodities, which was equal to $16.9 billion from Korea to China 
between 1989 and 2001. During the same period, commodities export from China to Korea 
also went up from $472 million to $12.5 billion. In addition, Korean economy encountered 
both positive and adverse effect caused by Chinese economic reform. On the positive side, 
Chinese market for Korean products grew larger due to the Chinese rapid industrialization. 
On the negative side, Korea also lost comparative advantage in many manufacturing 
industries to China because of the Chinese industrialization (Kim & Lee, 2009).   
2.2. Overview of Chinese antidumping measures against Korea 
According to International Bar Association (2010), some countries globally started to 
use anti-dumping measures more frequently after recent economic crisis. Particularly, China 
became one of the main users of these measures (Zhang & Zhou, 2016). In the context of 
Chinese-Korean trade relation, the two countries trade substantially with each other and in 
fact, China is Korean’s third biggest trading partner (Kim & Lee, 2009). Despite the 
significance in this bilateral trade, China has been constantly initiated anti-dumping cases 
against Korea since 1997. These initiated cases results in 59 HS level products which are 
subject to Chinese anti-dumping measures (Bown, 2016). Furthermore, the empirical finding 
in this paper indicates that Chinese anti-dumping measures disrupt trade flow from Korea. 
Statistically, Chinese import quantity and import value from Korea decrease by 18% and 13% 
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respectively when China imposes anti-dumping measure on her trade flow from Korea. 
Obviously, this type of trade remedy has an adverse effect on Chinese import from Korea. 
2.3. Empirical literature 
There are some previous studies which put emphasis on the relationship between anti-
dumping measures and trade flow. Utilizing trade flow data and data relating to anti-dumping 
measures, Nakgyoon (2016) studied the relationship between anti-dumping measure and 
import in US, EU, China and India and in his paper, it was found that imported products will 
be decreased by about 0.43% to 0.51% if there is 1% rise in anti-dumping duties (Nakgyoon, 
2016).  
Bellora and Jean (2016) employed trade flow data to examine relationship between 
anti-dumping and import from China to European Union (EU). The study indicated that there 
is decrease in anti-dumping duties and number of anti-dumping sanctions against Chinese 
exports when EU grants China market economy status. Statistically, Bellora and Jean (2016) 
proved that Chinese exports to EU increase from 3.9% to 5.3% due to the reduction of anti-
dumping duties and number of sanctions.  
Besedes and Prusa (2013) used random effects probit model and import data in U.S. 
from Q2-1990 to Q4-2006 to study relationship between anti-dumping action and trade. In 
their study, it was found out that anti-dumping measures can eliminate trade and it can 
increase hazard rate by more than 50%.  
Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2012) used trade flow data combined with data 
relating to anti-dumping measures to study the effect of anti-dumping measures on trade flow 
from China to India. In their paper, it was found out that Indian anti-dumping measures 
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reduce both China’s export value and quantity sharply and suddenly (Vandenbussche & 
Viegelahn, 2012). 
Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) employed annual trade flow data which covered 
many exporting countries and their trading partners adopting anti-dumping law to investigate 
relationship between anti-dumping and trade flow between new adopters of anti-dumping law 
and their trading partners. The study indicated that there is a heterogeneous impact of anti-
dumping on volume of import across different sectors. They also proved that there is a 
decrease of 5.9% of import, which is equivalent to 14 billion US$, for new tough users of 
anti-dumping law (Vandenbussche & Zanardi, 2010).    
Park (2009) used anti-dumping cases initiated from 1997 to 2004 combined with trade 
flow data to study relationship between Chinese anti-dumping investigation and trade. The 
result of the study indicated that anti-dumping investigation causes Chinese imports from 
named countries to decrease by at least 29.6% in the following year (Park, 2009).  
Prusa (1996) utilized line item tariff code and anti-dumping duty for each of the 428 
anti-dumping cases filed between 1980 and 1988 to investigate anti-dumping in US. The 
study showed that size of anti-dumping duty has profound effect on imports into United 
Stated. Prusa (1996) also found that there is 47% decrease in US imports from her trading 
partners which are subject to anti-dumping investigation during the first year for countries 
suffering from high anti-dumping duty.   
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data collection 
In order to study relationship between Chinese anti-dumping measures and her import 
from Korea, this paper utilizes data from three different sources. The first source is World 
Bank’s Global Antidumping Database which comprises of anti-dumping cases globally 
(Bown, 2016). This paper utilizes 33 anti-dumping cases initiated by China against Korea for 
the period from 1997 to 2012. These 33 cases include 59 products at HS 6-digit level. Table 1 
provides general information about the 33 Chinese anti-dumping cases against Korea.  
[Table 1] 
The second source is UN Comtrade Database which includes both quantity and value 
of trade flow for 70 reporting countries. To match with the above mentioned 33 anti-dumping 
cases, I extract Chinese import data which involves with the 59 HS products from Korea from 
1992 to 2016. The third source is World Bank Open Data and for the purpose of data analysis 
in this study, I extract GDP and population of both China and Korea from 1992 to 2016 from 
this database.  
3.2. Model 
To consistently model trade flow, Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2012) proposed 
Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) instead of ordinary least square methodology 
(OLS) because PPML could account for zero trade flow as zero numbers would not drop out 
of the equation. In addition, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) stated that PPML could be 
used to model trade flow even though there was no zero trade flow. In their study, Santos-
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) utilized Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance of 
PPML and found out that PPML could produce a better result compared to OLS when there 
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was a presence of heteroskedasticity. Due to the fact that zero trade flow and 
heteroskedasticity are the main concerns in this paper, PPML is set up in order to study 
relationship between anti-dumping measures and trade flow from Korea to China. The 
equation is constructed as below. 
IMit = Exp(α +β1AD +β2GDPct +β3GDPkt +β4Populationct 
+β5Populationkt +Ԑt +Ԑi +Ԑckit) 
The dependent variable IMit represents Chinese import quantity and import value 
from Korea for product i in year t and this import data comprises of 59 products and these 
products are recorded at HS 6-digit level. The first independent variable is anti-dumping 
measure dummy which is equal to 1 when anti-dumping measures are in place after they have 
been imposed or equal to 0 when anti-dumping measures are not imposed on import. Ԑi is 
product specific fixed effect, Ԑt is time fixed effect and Ԑkcit is the error term. 
Besides the main independent variable which is anti-dumping dummy, there are other 
controlled independent variables suitable for modeling trade flow as suggested by 
Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010). Exporter’s GDPk controls for supply effect while 
importer’s GDPc control for demand effect. This paper also controls populations in both 
exporting and importing countries because it is generally accepted that big countries trade 
more than small countries if we look at absolute quantities. Product fixed effect is included in 
the equation in order to control individual effect which is unique to each product and time 
fixed effect is used to control for time variation which is very common to trade relationship. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL FINDING AND RESULT DISCUSSION 
 This chapter shows the impact of Chinese anti-dumping measures on her import from 
Korea using PPML with product fixed effect and time fixed effect and also discusses 
implicative findings. Table 2 illustrates the impact of anti-dumping measures on quantity of 
trade flow from Korea to China. When I control GDP and population in both exporting and 
importing countries and include product fixed effect and time fixed effect, Poisson estimation 
produces significant and negative coefficient, which is equal to -0.20 at 95% confidence 
interval. This corresponded to 18% reduction of Chinese import quantity from Korea when 
Chinese anti-dumping measures are in place.    
[Table2] 
 Table 3 shows the impact of anti-dumping measures on value of trade flow from 
Korea to China. While controlling for GDP and population in both China and Korea and 
including product fixed effect and time fixed effect, Poisson estimation produces a significant 
and negative coefficient, which is equal to -0.14 at 95% confidence interval. This 
corresponded to 13% decrease in Chinese import value from Korea when Chinese anti-
dumping measures are in place. 
[Table 3] 
 Other controlled variables also have significant coefficients and expected signs. For 
population of China and Korea, the coefficients are positive and significant. It is as expected 
because it is generally accepted that the larger the country’s population become, the more 
they trade with one another. Korean GDP has positive sign and significant coefficient and 
GDP of China has negative sign and significant coefficient. It is also as anticipated because 
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there is a general agreement that export positively correlates with GDP while import 
negatively correlates with GDP.  
 PPML shows significant and negative coefficient for both import quantity and import 
value. It can be stated that Chinese anti-dumping measures can disrupt her trade flow from 
Korea. On positive side, this trade remedy will allow both China and Korea to trade with each 
other fairly. Injured domestic industries in China will benefit from this trade remedy and gain 
bigger share of domestic market because Chinese anti-dumping measures will increase the 
price of dumped products and bring it up to normal value for like products destined for 
consumption in Korea. This will discourage Korean exporters to export their products to 
China at the dumped price. On negative side, China may employ anti-dumping measures in 
order to protect her domestic producers from Korean competitors. In the same way, this 
disguised trade remedy will increase the price of Korean products which are exported to 
China and create favorable environment for Chinese producers and pose threat to Korean 
producers.  
 Even though WTO members have significantly enhanced the rules regarding anti-
dumping during Uruguay round, many countries nowadays still misuse the rules in order to 
protect their domestic industries. This happens because there are still loopholes such as the 
obligation to prevent misuse of anti-dumping rules and investigation procedures in agreement 
governing anti-dumping. To deal with this issue, WTO members have to seriously work on 
the revision and improvement of anti-dumping agreement in the next ministerial meeting in 
order to prevent some countries from exploiting the loopholes in the anti-dumping agreement.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 This paper uses Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood and trade flow data at HS 
product level to examine the relationship between anti-dumping and trade flow from Korea to 
China. The empirical finding in this study indicates that anti-dumping adversely affect trade 
flow from Korea to China. Statistically, Chinese import quantity and import value from 
Korea decrease by 18% and 13% respectively when Chinese anti-dumping measures are in 
place.  
 The empirical findings in this study are in consonance with other existing literature. 
Because Chinese anti-dumping measures can depress import from Korea, domestic producers 
who are injured because of dumped products from Korea will benefit from this trade remedy 
as they gain bigger share of domestic market. In worse situation, China may use anti-
dumping to protect her domestic producers and create unfavorable trading environment and 
unfair competition for Korean exporters. This issue must be addressed at international level 
because at country level, individual governments will do their best to find ways to help their 
domestic industries and prioritize their own benefit. Hence, all WTO members have to come 
together and cooperate with each other in order to improve the legal framework regarding 
anti-dumping so that individual countries can be prevented from abusing anti-dumping law 
for their own benefit.    
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Table 1. Chinese anti-dumping cases against Korea from 1997 to 2012 
Product Date of 
initiation 
Number of 
HS products 
Outcome 
Newsprint in Rolls or Sheets 
 
12/10/1997 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Polyester Film 
 
04/16/1999 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Cold-Rolled Steel Sheets 
 
06/17/1999 
 
7 Price undertaking 
Dichloromethane (Methylene Chloride) 
 
12/20/2000 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Polystyrene 
 
02/09/2001 
 
1 No measure imposed 
Lysine and its Esters and Salts Thereof  
 
06/14/2001 
 
1 No measure imposed 
Polyester Chip 
 
08/03/2001 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Polyester Staple Fibre 
 
08/03/2001 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Esters of Acrylic Acid  
 
08/03/2001 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Paper and Paperboard of a kind used for Writing  
 
02/06/2002 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Phthalic Anhydride  03/06/2002 1 Ad valorem duty 
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Styrene Butadine Rubber (SBR) 
 
03/20/2002 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Cold-Rolled Steel Products 
 
03/20/2002 
 
11 Ad valorem duty 
Polyvinyl Chloride  
 
03/29/2002 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Toluene Diisocyanate  
 
05/22/2002 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Phenol (Hydroxybenzene) and its Salts  
 
08/01/2002 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Pure MDI Polymeric-MDI 
 
09/20/2002 
 
2 No measure imposed 
Chloroform (Trichloromethane)  
 
05/30/2003 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Dispersion Unshifted Single-Mode Optical Fiber 
 
07/01/2003 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Hydrazine and Hydroxylamine and their 
Inorganic Salts  
 
12/17/2003 
 
1 Duty if price falls 
under a given level 
Unbleached Kraft Liner/Linerboard 
 
03/31/2004 
 
5 Ad valorem duty 
Bisphenol-A (BPA) 
 
05/12/2004 
 
1 No measure imposed 
Ethylenepropylenenonconjugated Diene Rubber 08/10/2004 1 No measure imposed 
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(EPDM)  
 
 
Disodium 5'-Inosinate Disodium 5'-Guanylate 
Disodium 5’-Ribonucleotide 
 
11/12/2004 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Epichlorohydrin (ECH) 
 
12/28/2004 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Spendex 
 
04/13/2005 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Octanol (Octyl Alcohol) and Isomers Thereof  
 
09/15/2005 
 
1 No measure imposed 
Bisphenol-A (BPA) 
 
08/30/2006 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Acetone/Dimethyl Ketone or 2-Propanone  
 
03/09/2007 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Dimethyl Cyclosiloxane or Cyclic Dimethyl 
Siloxane 
 
05/28/2008 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Adipic Acid or AA 
 
11/10/2008 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Terephthalic Acid 
 
02/12/2009 
 
2 Ad valorem duty 
Solar Grade Polysilicon 
 
07/20/2012 
 
1 Ad valorem duty 
Source: Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2016) 
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Table 2. Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation: Impact of AD 
measures on the Chinese import quantity from Korea  
 Dependent variable: Import 
quantity 
Anti-dumping measures dummy (AD) -0.20 * 
Chinese GDP -2.20 * 
Korean GDP 1.72 * 
Chinese population 7.01 * 
Korean population 3.31 * 
Product fixed effects Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Number of HS products 59 
Number of observations 1340 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on UN Comtrade and Global Antidumping Database 
(Bown, 2016) 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 3. Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation: Impact of AD 
measures on the Chinese import value from Korea 
 Dependent variable: Import value 
Anti-dumping measures dummy -0.14 * 
Chinese GDP -1.33 * 
Korean GDP 1.49 * 
Chinese population 6.88 * 
Korean population 4.29 * 
Product fixed effects Yes  
Year dummies Yes 
Number of HS products 59 
Number of observations 1340 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on UN Comtrade and Global Antidumping Database 
(Bown, 2016) 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Figure 1. Annual GDP of People’s Republic of China and Republic of Korea, in US 
dollars  
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Figure 2. Total population of People’s Republic of China and Republic of Korea  
 
